Considered by his contemporaries to be the greatest logician since Aristotle and deeply admired by Albert Einstein, with whom he shared his daily walks, Kurt Gödel forever transformed the foundations of knowledge by demonstrating that no formal mathematical system is capable of proving all the truths within it. This monumental discovery shattered the rationalist dream of grounding absolute knowledge. It also projected its limits onto physics, prompting figures like Stephen Hawking to question the possibility of a definitive Theory of Everything, and onto artificial intelligence, suggesting—as Roger Penrose argues—that the human mind possesses an insight that transcends algorithms. This, in turn, invites us to believe that the universe requires an explanation that lies outside of itself.
A mathematical theorem that shapes our thinking
Kurt Gödel was undoubtedly one of the most influential mathematicians of all time. Although his name is widely recognized in the scientific world, it remains surprisingly unknown to the general public.
Albert Einstein, who was a colleague of Gödel at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton for a few years, admired him deeply, and, since they lived nearby, they shared a daily half-hour walk to and from work. Einstein once confessed that he went to his office “just to have the privilege of walking home with Kurt Gödel”.[1] John von Neumann, another great mathematical genius of the twentieth century, praised him, declaring that “Kurt Gödel is the greatest logician since Aristotle”,[2] to which physicist John Wheeler added, “If you called him the greatest logician since Aristotle, you’d be downgrading him”.[3]
This finding forever transformed the foundations of mathematics and shattered the widely-held belief in materialist rationalism that all truth could be proven by science.
The Theorem statement
Gödel proved that any consistent and sufficiently complex axiomatic system (i.e., capable of containing elementary arithmetic) is necessarily incomplete. This implies that there will always be true propositions that cannot be proven or disproven within the system itself. Furthermore, he established that no such system can demonstrate its own consistency by its own rules.
Understanding the proof requires advanced mathematical tools, but we can use Euclidean geometry (which we all study in school) to visualize what an axiomatic system is. Euclid constructed his geometry from basic principles or axioms that he accepted without proof, such as the axiom that “through two points, there passes a unique straight line”.
The essential difference introduced by Gödel is that, although axiomatic systems allow theorems to be constructed from clear rules, in sufficiently rich systems, such as arithmetic, not even all possible axioms allow all truths to be proven. There are always true statements beyond the scope of the system, which forever shattered the dream of mathematically grounding absolute knowledge.
Hilbert’s program collapses
At the beginning of the twentieth century, David Hilbert promoted the formalist school, which argued that mathematics was a product of pure human logic and that, in principle, all mathematical truths could be proven using an adequate set of axioms and rules.
Gödel’s presentation at the 1930 International Congress of Mathematicians in Königsberg put an end to that dream. Von Neumann, deeply involved in the Hilbertian program, immediately understood the magnitude of the discovery and admiringly stated that “Kurt Gödel’s achievement in modern logic is singular and monumental – indeed it is more than a monument, it is a landmark which will remain visible far in space and time… The subject of logic has certainly completely changed its nature and possibilities with Gödel’s achievement”.[4]
It no longer made sense to seek a simultaneously consistent and complete mathematical system. The limit was structural.
The limit of physics: a Theory of Everything (TOE) is not possible
Despite the fact that during the twentieth century General Relativity, on the largest scales, and Quantum Mechanics, on the smallest, have described the universe with enormous precision, both theories remain incompatible. Nevertheless, the most eminent physicists have made every effort to resolve this divide. Einstein, who dedicated half his life to this endeavor, defined his goal as follows: “I want to know how God created this world. I am not interested in this or that phenomenon. I want to know His thoughts, the rest are details”.[6] We already know that he did not succeed. Proposals such as string theory, M-theory and loop quantum gravity are still under development today, but none has been experimentally confirmed.
Gödel’s theorems introduce a profound conceptual limitation: it may be impossible for any system—including the physical one—to explain or predict everything from within itself. Von Neumann remarked that “Gödel actually proved this theorem, not with respect to mathematics only, but for all systems which permit a formalization, that is a rigorous and exhaustive description, in terms of modern logic”.[7] For this reason, it is particularly applicable to physics, since its laws are expressed through mathematical structures.
This has been understood since the middle of the last century by numerous physicists such as Stanley L. Jaki and Freeman Dyson, who in 2004 wrote, “The laws of physics are a finite set of rules, and include the rules for doing mathematics, so that Gödel’s theorem applies to them”.[8]
Of particular relevance in this debate was Stephen Hawking’s change of mind, after having dedicated much of his scientific career to the search for a Theory of Everything. In his book A Brief History of Time, published in 1988, he claimed that it was possible to develop a definitive physical theory, which would allow us to know “the mind of God”. However, in 2002, in his lecture Gödel and The End of Physics, he admitted: “[…] we are not angels, who view the universe from the outside. Instead, we and our models are both part of the universe we are describing. Thus a physical theory is self referencing, like in Gödel’s theorem. One might therefore expect it to be either inconsistent or incomplete. The theories we have so far are both inconsistent and incomplete”. He concluded his retraction saying that, “Some people will be very disappointed if there is not an ultimate theory that can be formulated as a finite number of principles. I used to belong to that camp, but I have changed my mind”.[9]
The human mind is not an algorithm
Drawing on Gödel, he argues that the human mind can recognize the truth of unprovable statements within a formal system, something impossible for an algorithm, which can only execute recursive rules.
Gödel’s theorem states that, in any sufficiently complex formal system, there are true statements that the system cannot prove using its own rules. According to Penrose, the fact that human understanding can perceive the truth of these unprovable statements (inscrutable to the system) implies that our mind uses noncomputational procedures. While the human mind operates, at least in part, through a mathematical intuition that transcends algorithms, the machine remains confined to the recursive execution of predefined rules.
It is interesting to note the parallel between this conclusion by Penrose, based on Gödel’s theorem, and the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. According to Thomistic thought, in humans, a spiritual and a material component coexist. While the material aspect could be linked to formal, logical intellectual activity (ratio), which operates through step-by-step syllogisms, the spiritual component is the one that allows knowledge through direct intuition (intellectus). From this perspective, a Turing machine, being a purely material device, is limited to formalized processing; in contrast, as St. Thomas suggests, only the human mind, thanks to its spiritual dimension, is able to carry out the intuitive intellectual activity needed to grasp true mathematical meaning.[11]
A theorem applicable to the Universe
We increasingly recognize the Universe as a mathematical and logical system, so incompleteness applies to it.
The implications are profound: the universe, made up of matter, energy, space and time, cannot fully explain itself. It needs a cause or foundation outside itself, which is not defined by those same categories: a principle that must be both immaterial and transcendent.
Gödel shows us how the inquisitive nature of human thought, by exploring mathematical truths, leads us to consider the nature of our existence.
Manuel Ribes
Bioethics Observatory – Institute of Life Sciences
Catholic University of Valencia
References:
[1] Sami Al-Suwailem Remembering Gödel Medium Dec 16, 2023
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Sai Sasank Only So Much We Can Prove Medium Nov 15, 2020
[5] LaPlace, Pierre Simon. Essai philosophique sur les probabilités. Paris: Courcier, 1814. p. 4 <http://eudml.org/doc/203193 >.
[6] Donovan Alexander Is a Theory of Everything Possible? Here Are Some of the Most Interesting Candidates Interesting Engineering Jun 04, 2025
[7] Sami Al-Suwailem Remembering Gödel Medium Dec 16, 2023
[8] Solomon Feferman The nature and significance of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton Gödel Centenary Program Friday, Nov. 17, 2006
[9] Stephen Hawking Gödel and the End of Physics Academic Lectures 2002 https://www.hawking.org.uk/in-words/lectures/godel-and-the-end-of-physics
[10] A Turing machine is a theoretical computer model proposed by Alan Turing in 1936 to formalize the notion of “algorithm”. It consists of an infinite tape divided into squares, a head that reads and writes symbols, and a finite set of rules that dictate its actions. With this extremely simple mechanism, it can simulate any computational process that can be algorithmically described. No physical machine (including the most advanced computer we could ever build in the future) will be able to compute anything that a Turing machine cannot compute.
[11] Alfred Driessen Philosophical consequences of the Gödel theorem Published in: Human Approach to the Universe, Ed. Eeva Martikainen Luther-Agricola-Society, 2005, Helsinki, Finland pp 66-74 https://philarchive.org/rec/DRIPCO