In March 2025, the medical discharge of an Australian patient who survived for over 3 months with a total artificial heart marked an unprecedented milestone in contemporary medicine. The BiVACOR device, the culmination of more than 20 years of research, allows individuals to lead an active life with a functional mechanical heart outside the hospital setting for the first time. This technological advance, however, raises fundamental ethical and anthropological questions: To what extent is it ethically legitimate to intervene in the human body using technological means? Does this represent a humanizing medicine or the threshold of transhumanism? Faced with these questions, it is important to note that medical technology, when it is at the service of life, dignity, and the nature of the person, far from blurring their identity, upholds and safeguards it.
In March 2025, an Australian patient was discharged from hospital with an artificial heart made entirely of titanium, living with the device for more than 3 months while awaiting a definitive transplant.[1] This milestone achieved by the BiVACOR device[2] – the result of more than two decades of research – constitutes an unprecedented clinical and scientific breakthrough in the treatment of end-stage heart failure. For the first time ever, it allowed a patient to live an active life with a completely mechanical heart outside the hospital setting.
The compact device, which has neither valves nor many components, uses a single rotating levitating hub that regulates blood flow according to the patient’s activity, minimizing mechanical risks.[3] Beyond biomedical success, however, this development raises questions about the limits of technological intervention in the human body, challenging different ethical, anthropological, and traditional philosophical concepts.
The real possibility of replacing a vital organ with a durable functional machine challenges the very concept of corporeality and personal identity, opening a potential debate as to whether these interventions represent a humanizing approach to medicine or whether they are a prelude to a transhumanist logic aimed at transcending human nature through technology.
The use of the BiVACOR device should not be interpreted as a step towards the artificial transcendence of our nature, but rather as a practical expression of care-oriented medicine, framed in the
Technology and humanism: a necessary transition
Technological advances in medicine can present a structural ambivalence: they can cure or dehumanize, save or objectify. In this case, the BiVACOR artificial heart is a paradigmatic example of this balance. Its clinical success is indisputable, but its ethical and anthropological significance requires reflection. The question is not just whether it can be done, but “should it be done?”,[4] and under what conditions.
From a humanistic perspective, the human body is not merely an object of interchangeable parts, but a constitutive dimension of the subject.[5] In this sense, the introduction of mechanical devices to replace vital functions such as blood circulation to sustain the life of the patient raises questions about human identity, integrity, and the meaning of life.
Technology can help, but must not overstep its boundaries. Thus, what determines the value of an action – or in this case, the value of this intervention – is not its technological complexity, but its focus on the integral well-being of the person[6] and their improvement from the point of view of health. In this instance, the implantation of the artificial heart is not intended to create a new type of human, but to sustain a life in a critical condition; it may be thus understood as a technology of support and not of posthuman enhancement.
Ethical perspective: care, proportionality, and responsibility
Any ethical reflection on the use of an artificial heart must be based on sound principles that are not reduced to the calculation of benefits, but that consider the whole person. In this framework, the concept of proportionality takes on a key role. Implantation of the BiVACOR device is justified as an extraordinary and, as it were, temporary measure in the face of an imminent harm: death due to irreversible heart failure. It does not seek an indefinite prolongation of life or a mere artificial enhancement of the human body, instead offering a realistic alternative until a compatible human organ becomes available.
This use is ethically guided by a logic of care, not of domination.[7] The artificial heart does not turn the patient into a “cyborg”, nor does it seek to replace their biological nature; rather, it adapts to their vulnerability and sustains them temporarily. Such use is framed within an ethics of responsibility, such as that formulated by Hans Jonas,[8] which calls for prudence and foresight when acting on the fundamental aspects of human life.
A favorable assessment is also possible from the perspective of bioethical principlism[9]:
- Autonomy: the patient acts with informed consent.
- Beneficence: the patient’s physical and psychological well-being is sought.
- Non-maleficence: greater harm (death) is avoided with an acceptable clinical risk.
- Justice: this technology can offer a more equitable solution to the organ shortage.
It is in personalist bioethics[10] , however, where this intervention finds its deepest justification: the artificial heart is put at the service of life, dignity, and personal integrity, without seeking to redefine its essence or nature:
- Primacy of the person over technology: use of the artificial heart is considered ethically acceptable since it is used in the service of the life and dignity of the patient, without instrumentalizing them or reducing them to biological materialism.
- Principle of the defense of life: use of the BiVACOR device is morally justified because it protects physical life in a life-or-death situation.
- Principle of totality: replacing a damaged organ is permitted if it contributes to the good of the person as a whole and does not involve mutilation, but rather a functional restoration.
- Principle of freedom and responsibility: the patient must give free and informed consent, fully aware of the temporary and therapeutic nature of the device.
- Respect for personal identity and corporeality: the body is not interchangeable or reducible to mere functional parts. Living with an artificial heart requires that the intervention does not alter the patient’s self-perception or dignity.
- Technology as care, not as domination: the BiVACOR device is deemed ethically licit if it supports patient care, human vulnerability, but not if it seeks to transcend human biological limits, as proposed by transhumanism.
Anthropology of the body and limits of intervention
Living with an artificial heart, although clinically viable, can be experienced as a profound alteration of one’s self-perception. However, if this experience is integrated into a life narrative that respects the patient’s identity and helps them maintain their autonomy and nature, then it can be assumed without a loss of their natural humanity and vulnerability.[12] In this regard, medicine must be associated with this meaning, not solely with efficacy.
In contrast to transhumanist proposals that seek to eliminate the vulnerability presented by our own nature, the BiVACOR device represents a technology that recognizes and supports it. Its value is not in permanently replacing parts of the human body, but in sustaining it while awaiting a rational response. Thus, it does not deny finitude, but rather accepts it from a logic of care.
The transhumanist horizon: a heart without humanity?
Transhumanism is a techno-scientific paradigm that promotes the artificial enhancement of human capabilities through technology. Its horizon is the overcoming of death, of our finiteness, seeking fusion with the machine and the transcendence of the biological body.[13] From this perspective, the artificial heart could seem like another step on the path toward a “superman” or “cyborg”.
It should be noted that the human body is not a prosthetic device or a set of interchangeable parts, but a constitutive dimension of the person. Personal identity is not created independently of the body, but through its integration with the body, mind, history, and ability to relate with others.[14] To radically replace this corporeality without considering its ontological implications is to dehumanize the person.
Medicine cannot become a tool for engineering posthumans, as it must retain its vocation to heal and not to redesign. The use of BiVACOR is licit insofar as it is aimed at restoring vital balance and not at the creation of a new life form indefinitely assisted by machines.
Ethics as the foundation of duty
The moral legitimacy of an action cannot be reduced solely to its technical viability, since its authentic foundation lies in ontological respect for the person. Thus, any medical intervention, however technologically advanced, must stem from an ethical judgment that takes into account the intrinsic dignity of mankind. It is not enough for something to be technically possible; it must also be morally legitimate. Such legitimacy is only achieved when the ethical norm arises from within the moral being, i.e., when the “ought” is deeply connected to the very being of the person, considered in their totality, with their vulnerability, freedom, and openness to the truth.[15]
Medical ethics cannot disregard respect for the intrinsic dignity of the human being, since the person must never be treated as a means, but as an end in themselves. The BiVACOR artificial heart is ethically acceptable precisely because it is used to preserve that dignity and not to override it, thus becoming a tool of service to the person and not of domination.[16]
Conclusion: humanizing, not transhumanist medicine
Far from being a step towards transhumanism, the BiVACOR device, when used with clear ethical criteria – proportionality, therapeutic purpose, respect for bodily identity and the totality of the person, and informed consent – forms part of a logic of care that embraces human vulnerability without attempting to eliminate or alter it.
Thus understood, the artificial heart does not anticipate a new type of technologically redesigned human being, but bears witness to a medical technique that remains true to its vocation: to sustain life, alleviate suffering, and support the human being in their fragility, without blurring the essence of their nature. Technology, therefore, is not an enemy of humanity if it is subordinated to an ethic that guides it, that knows when to intervene and when to leave room for the natural, and that, above all, keeps the question of the meaning of life alive. For only from that ethical foundation can technology truly serve man, rather than seek to replace him.
José María Díaz Sánchez
Graduate in Philosophy. University of Murcia
Master’s in Bioethics. Catholic University of Valencia
References
- Alvarado García, A. (2004). La ética del cuidado. Revista Aquichan, 4(4), 30–39.
- BiVACOR. BiVACOR. https://bivacor.com/
- Bostrom, N. (2011). Una historia del pensamiento transhumanista. Argumentos de razón técnica: Revista española de ciencia, tecnología y sociedad, y filosofía de la tecnología, (14), 157–191.
- Burgos, J. M. (2009). Reconstruir la persona. Ensayos personalistas. Palabra.
- Burgos, J. M. (2019). El personalismo de Karol Wojtyla como personalismo integral: Un análisis filosófico y una propuesta. Cuadernos de Pensamiento, 32, 105–134.
- Burgos, J. M. (2020). ¿Qué es el personalismo integral? Quién, (12), 9–37.
- Declaración de Kigali de la AMM sobre el uso ético de la tecnología médica. Asociación Médica Mundial. https://www.wma.net/es/policies-post/declaracion-de-la-amm-sobre-la-etica-medica-y-la-tecnologia-medica-avanzada/
- Esquema de las dimensiones y desarrollo de la persona. Bioética para Todos. https://bioeticaparatodos.com/esquema-de-las-dimensiones-y-desarrollo-de-la-persona/
- García, J. J. (2013). Bioética personalista y bioética principialista: Perspectivas. Cuadernos de Bioética, 24(80), 67–76.
- López López, A. F. (2021). Karol Wojtyla y su visión personalista del hombre. Cuestiones Teológicas, 39(91), 119–137.
- Miró López, S., & De la Calle Maldonado, C. (2021). Dos formas de entender la vulnerabilidad: Transhumanismo de Bostrom y antropología centrada en la persona. Cuadernos de Bioética, 32(105), 149–158.
- Siqueira, J. E. de. (2001). El principio de responsabilidad de Hans Jonas. Acta Bioethica, 7(2), 277–285.
- Un hombre vive más de tres meses con un corazón artificial en un exitoso ensayo. (2025, marzo 12). CNN en Español. https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/03/12/mundo/video/hombre-trasplante-corazon-artificial-australia-medicina-orix
- Un paciente sobrevive 100 días con un corazón artificial de titanio antes de recibir un trasplante cardíaco. iSanidad. https://isanidad.com/324237/un-paciente-sobrevive-100-dias-con-un-corazon-artificial-de-titanio-antes-de-recibir-un-trasplante-cardiaco/
- Vial Correa, J. de D., & Rodríguez Guerro, Á. (2009). La dignidad de la persona humana: Desde la fecundación hasta su muerte. Acta Bioethica, 15(1), 55–64.
[1] https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2025/03/12/mundo/video/hombre-trasplante-corazon-artificial-australia-medicina-orix
[2] https://bivacor.com/
[3] https://isanidad.com/324237/un-paciente-sobrevive-100-dias-con-un-corazon-artificial-de-titanio-antes-de-recibir-un-trasplante-cardiaco/
[4] https://www.wma.net/es/policies-post/declaracion-de-la-amm-sobre-la-etica-medica-y-la-tecnologia-medica-avanzada/
[5] https://bioeticaparatodos.com/esquema-de-las-dimensiones-y-desarrollo-de-la-persona/
[6] Burgos, J. M. (2020). ¿Qué es el personalismo integral? Quién, (12), 9-37. p 33
[7] Alvarado García, A. (2004). La ética del cuidado. Revista Aquichan, 4(4), 30-39. p 31
[8] Siqueira, J. E. de. (2001). El principio de responsabilidad de Hans Jonas. Acta Bioethica, 7(2), 277-285.
[9] García, J. J. (2013). Bioética personalista y bioética principialista: Perspectivas. Cuadernos de Bioética, 24(80), 67-76. p 69.
[10] García, J. J. (2013). Bioética personalista y bioética principialista: Perspectivas. Cuadernos de Bioética, 24(80), 67-76.
[11] Burgos, J. M. (2009). Reconstruir la persona. Ensayos personalistas. Palabra. p 218.
[12] Miró López, S., & De la Calle Maldonado, C. (2021). Dos formas de entender la vulnerabilidad: Transhumanismo de Bostrom y antropología centrada en la persona. Cuadernos de Bioética, 32(105), 149-158. p 155
[13] Bostrom, N. (2011). Una historia del pensamiento transhumanista. Argumentos de razón técnica: Revista española de ciencia, tecnología y sociedad, y filosofía de la 1 tecnología, (14), 157-191.
[14] López López, A. F. (2021). Karol Wojtyla y su visión personalista del hombre. Cuestiones Teológicas, 39(91), 119–137. p 132 – 133
[15] Burgos, J. M. (2019). El personalismo de Karol Wojtyla como personalismo integral: Un análisis filosófico y una propuesta. Cuadernos de Pensamiento, 32, 105–134. p 123 – 126
[16] Vial Correa, J. de D., & Rodríguez Guerro, Á. (2009). La dignidad de la persona humana: Desde la fecundación hasta su muerte. Acta Bioethica, 15(1), 55–64.