Author: D. Ignacio Carrasco de Paula,Bishop   of   Tapso was President of the Pontifical Academy for Life 

e-mail: carrasco@pusc.it

Is it morally licit to use medically assisted reproduction in a woman?  The response  of the  Congregation – a laconic  but  unequivocal non-licere,  it is not licit  – was   ultimately confirmed  the unanimous opinion  of the most accredited  moralists. But in what measure medically assisted could be morally acceptable help fecundation process to be achieved?  

Premise

I take it for granted  that the opposition, in line of principle,  of the Catholic  Church  with  respect  to  medically  assisted  procreation (MAP)  is sufficiently  well  known  by the  reader.  The  fundamental texts (I refer particularly to the instruction  Donum  vitae)1  are easily accessible  and furthermore, the latest edition of the Catechism  of the Catholic  Church  2  states,  with  the  clarity  and  concision  typical  of this  literary  genre,  some  of the  ethical  limits  of these  biotechnologies.

Therefore,  my objective  is not to explain  that doctrine,  but rather to examine  some  terminological, conceptual and hermeneutic issues that  are  essential  for  the  correct  interpretation and  application  of Church doctrine.

In  the  last  fifty  years,  Catholic  philosophy and  theology  have come a long way in the understanding of the nature and meaning  of human  love,  and,  with  it, the  understanding of the  father/mother- child relationship. The use of the phenomenological method,  and especially  the personalist approach,  has provided  new cognitive  instruments,  correcting  an excessively  legalistic  view of the marital  experience.  In some rare cases it has been possible to fall into the other end of the spectrum:  a personalist perspective that  is too one-sided and runs the risk of marginalising the consideration of the ontological aspects that underlie love and human procreation.

It is precisely to eliminate that  risk  that  these  reflections  start from the anthropological question:  What is man? An appropriate answer, perhaps  the most common  today  in the Christian  cultural  con- text, is the following:  man is a person, understanding by person both the Boethian meaning (subsistent individual himself endowed with a rational nature) and the axiological perspective  characteristic of modernity  (an end in himself and never a mere instrument).

Another possible answer, no less appropriate although somewhat fallen into disuse, appeals  to the Aristotelian  paradigm  of a rational animal  (zoon logikon)  in its double  aspect indicative  of the ontological status (what it is) and the ethical status (what it should choose to be). Since it is rationality that makes homo sapiens into a human being, it stands as the universal rule that regulates his behaviour. The contemporary statement “act according to what you are” (a person or corporeal being able to manage his own life) constitutes the core of what we call natural law.

This latter concept has almost disappeared from ethics treatises, leaving behind a huge vacuum that the category dignity is attempting to fill. It is an obvious process in bioethics.  It is a proper procedure, but requires quite a few caveats, since natural law and dignity are not superimposable axiological profiles. Dignity invites us to choose according to what one is worth, the natural law according to what one is. Both concepts are certainly closely related, but they are not the same, and neither is it always possible to reach the same conclusions with them.

The complexity of the speculative context in which human pro-creation is placed cannot be covered from the single concept of dignity. A parallel moral reflection attentive to the metaphysical foundations  is required,  a reflection  such  as that crystallised in the second part of the Summa  Theologica of Saint  Thomas  and which  the anti-metaphysical bias assumed  by modernity  has helped  to marginalise. That prejudice is perhaps the worst and most tragic mistake  of modernity.

The natural moral law has very little to do with mechanical laws or legal regulations. For it, the so-called naturalist fallacy has no value (it would  be wrong  to move  from  is to ought),  as the  natural moral law does not access the moral plane from the physical plane mechanically or automatically. The natural  moral  law  does  not impose rigid categorical imperatives like “you must do this”, but rather proposes  reasonable  choices  in the style of “you should choose to do this”. The natural  moral  law is present  only where  man can opt be-tween  behaving  or not as befits  the person  or human  nature,  so that the ethical reflection  would be a futile exercise if it could not be sup- ported by an anthropological reflection.  It is no accident  that the loss of interest  in the  natural  moral  law  coincides  with  the  invasion  of moral relativism.

 

Moral significance of “artificiality”. Natural vs unnatural

Since the very beginning, in referring to MAP, the Magisterium has used the adjective “artificial”: artificial insemination, artificial fertilisation.  Some  authors  see  in this  an early  denunciation of the ethical  negativity  of both procedures: reproducing with the aid of an artifice that which in itself is a natural process would necessarily entail corrupting  it. However, this theory is erroneous, or at least arguable.

In 1949, at the IV congress  of the IFCMA, Pius XII3  explained  that the reservations  held  against  artificial  insemination and/or  fertilisation by the Catholic  Magisterium “does  not necessarily prohibit  the use of artificial  means”.  Why then is this adjective used, even with the risk of confusing less sensible persons? Because that is the terminology legitimately imposed by scientific language.

In general,  science,  and also medicine,  coins terms that describe a human action or process or state, dispensing  with its moral significance;  e.g. the clinical expression  “suspend  fluids”  in itself  indicates nothing more than the decision to withdraw water provided intravenously or subcutaneously. In order for this act to be morally classified, as well as “what is done”, “the reason why it is done”4 (intentionality) must also be taken into account, e.g. to relieve a generalised  oedematous  condition,  or to reduce care during the terminal  phase  of  a disease  to  only  the  essential,  or  even  to  obtain death by dehydration. In the latter case, “suspend fluids” would  no longer be a therapeutic act like the other two, but a euthanasia practice.5

Artificial insemination (AI) per se means that the semen has reached the female genital tract, not as the exclusive result of a conjugal act, but thanks to the use of an instrument,  an artifice (a cannula). Whatever  the moral  sign  of that  action,  positive  or negative,  is another  matter  altogether,  since  it does  not depend  on the nature  of the instrument  used, but on how its instrumental  use (that way of inseminating) is positioned  (type of causality)  with respect  to the natural process of the procreative  function:  Does it modify it? Facilitate it? Impede it? Etc.

AI can work  in the procreative process  in two different  ways:  1. by introducing  the male semen obtained outside the conjugal act into the uterus, thereby substituting or marginalising that act, or 2. by collecting  the semen ejaculated  in the vaginal recess and successively transferring  it past uterine cervix, and in that case helping to over- come to  an obstacle  that causes  sterility.  The difference between these two modes is obvious, and crucial to the moral assessment. An artificial means is used in both cases, but in one it prevails over the natural act and replaces it, while the other, on the contrary,  is placed at its service,  it supports it.

There  is a net difference  in meaning  between  “natural”  applied “to what  is present  or is given  or produced  by nature”  (ontic  level) and  “natural”  applied  “to proper  free  action  or in accordance  with the way of being or nature of man” (ethical level). Classical philosophical language spoke of secundum naturam or also secundum rationem,  since  suitability  or conformity  is not decided  automatically but  is recognised  by reason  (recta  ratio),  thus  making  a good  and free decision  possible.  The  formulation  is complicated, but  it is something  that we do without difficulty  every day.

Once and for all: that which opposes natural  in its moral meaning is not the artificial,  but what is contrary  to reason,  the unreasonable, the irrational.

It is understood  thus because  disregarding  the marital  act to create a child is unnatural,  i.e. it is not reasonable, either from the point of view  of the  couple  who  aspire  to become  parents,  or from  the point of view of the child who could be conceived.  It is not reasonable for many reasons,  e.g. due to some unacceptable collateral  practices (gamete  donation)  or because  that procedure  violates  the dignity of the  persons  involved,  etc.,  but  above  all because  it does  not make  sense  (it would  be irrational)  to leave  aside  the only moment (the conjugal  union) that gives the spouses  true procreative causality. Without  that union,  in the best case, the spouses would  only supply the biological  material  required,  but they would not truly be parents, even though  they behave  as such in the education  of the newly  conceived being.

On the contrary,  using a cannula  to help to overcome  an anatomical obstacle  which makes a conjugal  act sterile is reasonable,  just as it is reasonable  to resort to hormone  or surgical  treatment  when necessary to recover fertility.

We are thus faced with a core principle: human procreation is in accordance with the way of being human, it is natural  or reasonable, when it takes place through the conjugal act. This act is secundum naturam  in both  senses  cited:  it forms  part of the process  intended by nature and, in turn, consents  to the free participation of the spouses in the creation  of a child  through  an act of donation  which  is at the same time bodily and spiritual.

Human procreation,   production and  reproduction: the  logic  of benevolence

Remember that by procreation we understand that human behaviour that sets the biological conditions necessary to enable a new human being  to be conceived.  This term contrasts with production (manufacture or transformation of a thing) and reproduction (manufacture or generation of an identical item or a copy).

A person is neither a thing nor a simple copy representative of its species: each human individual is a unique being, inimitable and irreplaceable. Procreation follows a logic given to the person, such as the logic of benevolence (freely wanting good for another), the logic of  the  unconditional gift.  Production and reproduction also have their logic, but it is not the logic of benevolence; it is the logic of productivity, the logic of obtaining satisfactory results for those who put it into practice  (although  not only for them).

The techniques used for MAP, which include in-vitro  fertilisation with subsequent embryo transfer  into a womb (IVF-ET),  are placed in the  logic  of productivity, a logic  that  cannot  not  exclude  a quality control mechanism  to reject defective products.  In fact, the evolution of IVF-ET, from its beginnings in 1978, has always pursued the best product possible according  to the standards in use and the desires of the clients. Hence the simultaneous use of several embryos, the introduction of intracytoplasmic sperm injection into the ovum (ICSI), preimplantation diagnosis, embryo reduction,  etc. It is very difficult for something that does not come from benevolence to be loved un- conditionally.

Both the instrumental logic of IVF-ET, with some of its secondary consequences (in particular, embryo manipulation and loss) alone support a consistently  negative  moral  judgement.  However,  as Don- um vitae expressly  states, not even the “simple  case” (which  theoretically  should  avoid  those  problems  as it occurs with  a single embryo) merits a different assessment.

Why? Because  these techniques  themselves  violate  the ordo naturae, from the time at which it is unreasonable for a human  being to be caused,  to be put into  being,  by virtue  of a technical  procedure, neither does it seem reasonable  that two spouses who cannot create a child,  choose  to assume  a passive  role  or a role  of simple  material cause  in a biotechnological process  which  effectively  sets  the  bio- logical  conditions  necessary  for the conception of the child.6  In other words,  in human  procreation, technique  logic  takes  the place  of the logic of benevolence; in reality,  the spouses  do not “give”  existence  to that child,  they  only  “wish”  it, “request”  it and, if all goes well,  “receive”  it. Once in their  arms  though,  the  spouses  can  embrace it, restoring  the ties of benevolence that are essential  to the father/mother-child relationship.

Ethical discernment of MAP: central role of the spousal union

 The  introduction   of AI  in  obstetric  practice  at  the  end  of  the XIX  century  as  a new  therapeutic standard  for  the  treatment  of some forms  of sterility encountered many difficulties from an ethical point of view. One of course was the understandable resistance to transferring a biotechnology developed in animal  husbandry  to the human world. In the Catholic sphere, several bishops asked the Congregation of the Holy Office for guidance. The question was formulated as follows: an adhiberi possit artificialis  mulieris fe- cundatio?  Is it morally licit to use AI in a woman?  The response  of the  Congregation – a laconic  but  unequivocal non  licere,  it is not licit  – was  published  in 1897  and  ultimately  confirmed  the unani- mous opinion  of the most accredited  moralists  of the time. In fact, the  technique  as it was  practiced  then  consisted  of two  unaccept- able elements: 1. the sperm was obtained by masturbation, and therefore,  2. the  conjugal  act  was  dispensed  with.  Later,  another serious  problem  would  be  added,  by  using  sperm  provided  by  a person other than the husband.

Fifty-two  years would pass before the Magisterium of the Church would  explain  the reasons  for this negative  judgement  in detail,  and it would do so in an address  by Pius XII in 1949,7  in order to moder- ate and channel  the debate and arguments wielded  among experts in favor  of and  against  AI.  Essentially, the Holy Father emphasised the following:

1. Only the spouses have a reciprocal right over their own bodies to engender  new life, an exclusive  and unalienable  right (excluding the use of donors);

2. While  it is true that AI can generate  a child and that the desire of the  couple  to be parents  is legitimate  in itself  (natural,  reason- able), that is not sufficient  to legitimise  the use of that technique  (it is not the same  to be able to do something  or want  to do it, than to have the right to do it);

3. In contrast,  the use of instruments “solely  destined  either to fa- cilitate  the  natural  act  or to cause  the  natural  act  normally  accom- plished to attain its end” may be licit.

That is, the correct ethical discernment of MAP establishes that:

1. The conjugal union is the only ontologically and ethically ap- propriate foundation for the generation of a human being;

2. Simultaneously, any eventual medical treatment of sterility should be designed as an aid to, and never as a replacement for, the conjugal union.

Indeed,  as we  have  seen,  there  is a substantial  ontological  and ethical  difference  between  “aid”  and “replace”:  simple  aid respects the father/mother-child relationship, while replacement irreversibly breaks  that  relationship, since  the  eventual  conception of a child would be an effect caused by the medical  act.8

 

Ethical discernment of MAP: “in vivo” conception

The Magisterium of the Church  has also been concerned  with an- other problem  related  with human  procreation  and apparently  oppo- site in sign to infertility  treatments;  I am referring to contraception.

In 1930, Pius XI addressed  the issue of contraception for the first time in an Encyclical  (Casti Connubii),9 defining it as “any use whatsoever of matrimony exercised  in such a way that the act is de- liberately frustrated  in its natural  power  to generate  life”.  Almost forty years later, Paul VI, in another Encyclical, HumanaeVitae,10 explained  the principle  better,  speaking  of “the inseparable  connec- tion between the two meanings of the conjugal act: the unitive sig- nificance  and the procreative significance” Both expressions – “pro- creative  virtue” and “inseparable connection” – are placed in the cat- egory of causality.  Contraception is a behaviour that aims to strip the conjugal  union  of a power  bestowed  on it by nature,  i.e. to be the source of existence  of a new human being.

Oddly  enough,  that same  action  occurs  in IVF-ET,  although  with one  difference: contraception counteracts the  procreative power  of the conjugal  union,  while  in IVF-ET  that power  is transferred  to an- other  situation:  to the doctor  who handles  the test tube or who per- forms the ICSI.

Hence the correct ethical discernment of MAP assumes that the fertilisation and conception of a new human being occurs  in its nat- ural  (or  reasonable)  place,  i.e.  “in  vivo”  (in  the  woman’s  genital tract) and never “in vitro” (in the laboratory).

This condition is required not only to respect the causality rela- tionship between  conjugal  union and procreation,  but also to protect the newly conceived being so that he or she cannot be an object of manipulation and/or discrimination (preimplantation diagnosis, cry- opreservation, etc.).

 

In conclusion

At this point, I do not think it out of place for the reader to ask some questions such as the following:

1. Is it morally acceptable to help spouses with infertility problems to satisfy their legitimate desire to become parents?

2. Is it morally acceptable to do so, not only with pharmacological and surgical treatments, but also, when these are not adequate, with an appropriate MAP?

3. Does a MAP technique that is effective, while also licit and respectful of the ethical imperatives of the natural moral law really exist?

Such deep questions underscore the extreme complexity of the ethical issues that accompany MAP. Do not forget that we are talking about something  that was considered impossible until recently: the procreation of a human  being, of a new person,  of someone  who, as the Christian faith teaches, is called to friendship with God and to participate in the intimate  life  of God.  It is reasonable, therefore, that the ethical criteria are extremely stringent, which  does not preclude an affirmative answer to the questions  above.11

In fact there  are no arguments,  either  from  a clinical  or ethical point  of view,  to exclude  a priori  the  possibility  of an appropriate MAP, unless the possibility  of distinguishing between  the natural and irrational,  between  the licit and illicit,  between  the correct  or incorrect application  of the teachings  of the Catholic Church is denied.12

I would  like to conclude  by recalling  a widely  shared  truth: boys and  girls  conceived  thanks  to MAP  procedures, of whom  there  are many today (they exceed a million), are rightfully persons, they are children  of God,  they  exist  because  God  has  not  refused  to infuse them with a rational  and immortal  soul. These children  have come to our world  in a different  way than would  have been reasonable,  but, despite  this,  or perhaps  because  of this,  they  are  completely welcome,  because  from  their  conception  until  their  natural  death,  they deserve to be treated as what they are: people called to participate  in Christ of the Eternal life of God.

 

References:

1    CONGREGATION  FOR  THE  DOCTRINE  OF THE  FAITH. Instruction  “Donum Vitae” (22 Febru- ary 1987).

2    Catechism of the Catholic Church (15 august 1997), nn. 2376-2378.

3    PIUS  XII.  Address  at the  IV  International  Congress  of Catholic  Doctors.  IFCMA .

29.09.1949.

4    ANSCOMBE  GEM. Modern Moral Philosophy.  Philosophy  1958; 33: 1-19.

5    This is the case of Terry Schiavo and Eluana Englaro.

6    In IVF-ET, the technical  act is efficient cause and not only instrumental  cause of the cre- ation. It is instead an instrument of desire of the aspiring parent

7    Ibid 3

8    Some manuals  use the expression  “Improper  Artificial  Insemination”  to refer to proce- dures that respect the conjugal act. I think that this terminology  should be avoided: what AI is or is not is established  by Medicine; what is licit or not, and why, corresponds  to Ethics.

9    PIUS XI. Encyclical Letter“Casti  Connubii” (31 December 1930).

10  PAUL VI. Encyclical Letter “Humanae Vitae” (25 July 1968).

11  I do not want to go into the analysis  of the innumerable  variants  of MAP  that currently exist, as this is a topic that requires separate treatment.  However  thirty years ago, moralists of renowned  authority  and prestige  believed,  for example,  that the technique  of GIFT  (col- lection of gametes  in the context of a conjugal  act and immediate  transfer separately  to the Fallopian tube) met the necessary  ethical conditions.  Curiously,  Donum vitae avoids contra- dicting this opinion.

12 Some people hold that any instrumental intervention in natural procreation violates the principle  of “inseparability” between  the unitive  dimension  and procreative  dimension  of the conjugal  act formulated  by Humanae  vitae.  However,  that argument  assumes  that the conjugal act and coitus (penetration)  are the same thing.

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  1. Christine Vollmer 10 March, 2014 at 12:43 pm - Reply

    Articulo maravillosamente claro. Me parece que hace falta mas informacion en otros articulos sobre las razones de tanta infertilidad, que antiguamente era excepcional.
    Mucho sufrimiento se podria evitar si los Catolicos supieran esas causas a tiempo.

    • Manuel Zunin 14 March, 2014 at 11:10 am - Reply

      Concordamos, el tema es de primera importancia para nuestro Observatorio. Hemos publicado investigaciones sobre las clínicas de FIV, que como norma no analizan las causas de la supuesta infertilidad y no muestran ningún interés en nada que no sea la FIV o la inseminación artificial, siempre fuera del acto conyugal con todas las implicancias éticas que conlleva. Seguimos con líneas de investigación en ese sentido.
      Por otra parte le pedimos más emails para que les podamos enviar nuestro boletín en castellano o español se lo agradeceríamos, nuestro objetivo, este año es llevar a los 40 mil suscriptores, recién vamos en 15 mil.
      Justo Aznar le manda un cariñoso saludo
      Manuel Zunín
      Redacción